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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents different theoretical perspectives on visual communication all of which point 
towards design of IT-media. The authors represented come from communication studies, film and 
media analysis and architecture, but they all aim to contribute to a theoretical framework of digital 
design. The intention of the paper is to discuss the different theoretical perspectives and see how far 
they may take us towards  - and to which extent it will be possible to contribute to  - an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework for design of interactive interfaces. The interface is visual 
and designed to communicate, but it is interaction that distinguishes digital interfaces from the more 
traditional media. It is argued that without the imaginative power of the user’s mind, visual 
communication will not open for interaction. Hence, it is necessary to integrate a psychological 
theory into the interdisciplinary theoretical framework.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Visual communication is the domain of 
creative disciplines such as media, drama, 
graphic design and film making, but it is also 
an essential foundation for the design of 
interfaces.  This is seen very clearly in web-
design, and in administrative systems the 
international development within the IT-
industry indicates that design of usable and 
aesthetic interfaces is becoming a competitive 
advantage.1  
 
Within the professional community, the 
design teams are interdisciplinary and each 
member brings his/her own tools and 
techniques to the work. Within research, 
different academic traditions have their own 
perspective and vocabulary through which the 
field is conceptualised and understood. The 
technological developments have led to new 
interdisciplinary approaches to interface 
design. However, the developments have yet 
to establish a truly interdisciplinary 
foundation. Because the field is still new, we 
all, sensibly enough, draw on what we already 
know and master.  
                                                 
1 Navision – personal communication  
 
 
 
In the following, different theoretical 
perspectives on visual communication will be 
presented. The authors who come from 
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communication studies, film and media 
analysis and architecture have been chosen 
because they all aim to contribute to a 
theoretical framework for interface design. 
The intention of the paper is to discuss these 
different theoretical perspectives and see how 
far they may take us towards  - and to which 
extent it will be possible to contribute to  - an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework for 
human-computer interaction.  
 
2. VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
The main function of visual communication is 
to express the designer’s intention in the 
communicative message, catching and 
maintaining the spectator’s attention, 
imagination and cognitive emotion. The 
addresser – or designer’s intention and the 
way it is expressed in the message are in 
focus. The issues are information and facts, 
but also communication of attitudes and 
emotions. Communication is also about the 
addressee’s reception of the message, the way 
the addressee interprets the text, the image, 
the film or the interface2. 
 
Visual communication is equally fundamental 
for digital design, although only few theories 
have developed a model for visual 
communication of interactive interfaces. 
However, Thorlacius` theoretical work (2001, 
2002) on the visual and aesthetic aspects of 
communication offers an approach to analysis 
and design of visual communication of web 
sites. The author takes her point of departure 
in the discussion of language functions in the 
classical communication theory of Roman 
Jakobson (1960), which she uses to develop 
and radically rethink the theoretical 
conceptual framework to contribute to a 
theory of visual communication.  
                                                 
2 Communication is also about context, code, medium, etc. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, a very simple model 
is sufficient 
 
Thorlacius takes the designer’s perspective 
and focuses on design – visual 
communication. But the conceptual model 
that she develops embeds both sides of 
communication: the designer – the interface 
design  - and the user. To understand visual 
communication, Thorlacius suggests making a 
distinction between the expressive function, 
the emotive function and the aesthetic 
function. The expressive function relates 
exclusively to the addresser. It is the designer 
who creates the expressions. The emotive 
function, on the other hand, is ascribed to both 
the addresser and addressee (the user) and is 
differentiated: the designer may possess/may 
not possess expressions of emotions that s/he 
evokes in the user, or the designer may 
unintentionally evoke expressions of 
emotions in the user. The last function deals 
with the aesthetic aspect, which is the focus of 
the author’s analysis. It is differentiated into 
aspects that may be expressible and 
inexpressible aesthetic aspects, the origin of 
which is ascribed to senses and feelings. 
Thorlacius defines the latter as the ability of 
visual language to communicate that, which 
cannot be classified. Thorlacius focuses on 
the image, but her understanding of the 
inexpressible aspects also relates to a user 
perspective. It is a mutual experience of 
inexpressibility. It is the designer’s 
experience of being unable to verbalise 
explicitly what s/he has expressed (in the 
design). But it is also the user’s experience of 
being unable to express what s/he perceives.  
 
2.1 Dynamic Graphics and Interaction 
Thorlacius´ paper is written from a designer 
and design perspective. However, the text 
embeds a perception of the human being on 
the other side of the screen: the user who 
perceives and reacts emotionally to the 
design. Although the perspective is not part of 
the author’s focus, the model opens the way 
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for an in depth analysis of the emotive and 
aesthetic expressions. It suggests a 
differentiation where the emotive function 
offers a handle with which to approach the 
psychological understanding of the user. 
However, it is not possible within the model 
to capture the individually perceived 
inexpressibility or rather the user’s perception 
of the in-expressible where the user brings 
her/is subjective experiences, attitudes, 
emotions, etc. to the interpretation of the 
visual communication. 
 
The interface is visual and designed to 
communicate. Thorlacius’ theoretical 
contribution is a first step in the direction of a 
model for analysis of interfaces.  But the 
interface is also designed to enhance users’ 
interaction with the computer, and it is 
interaction that distinguishes it-interfaces 
from the more traditional media. The next 
step is to search for a theoretical perspective 
that will contribute to an understanding of the 
interaction. I shall return to the issue. At this 
point, I want to pursue another aspect of 
visual communication pertaining to mental 
interaction that needs to be integrated into an 
interdisciplinary theoretical frame. Interaction 
is dynamic and the interface may be 
characterised as visual, dynamic graphics 
(Nielsen, Janni 1990), because visually 
communicating interfaces are dynamic and 
not static. Objects on the screen move, new 
objects emerge, text windows appear, clicking 
on objects lead to new digital pages or to 
animation, etc. Turning to filmmaking, the 
creation of dynamic pictures may take us a 
step further in our search for a theoretical 
frame. 
 
3. FROM LIVING PICTURES TO 
MEDIA GAMES 
Filmmaking has a long tradition in visual 
communication, but works with other tools 
than traditional graphic design because a film 
consists of “living pictures” not a static 
image. In his article: Interacting with Pictures: 
film, narrative and interaction, Steven Boyd 
Davis (2002) discusses the knowledge he 
gained in filmmaking and how it may benefit 
design of interactive media games. He takes 
the filmmaker’s perspective focusing on the 
making of an imagined vision. He reminds us 
that film is essentially pictorial. It is not 
showing, but constructing an aspect of vision 
that the film-viewer needs to make sense of 
the film. The filmmaker does so by offering, 
"fragmentary evidence, organised with a view 
to affording certain assumptions and 
interpretations, and the film-viewer (partly on 
the basis of shared conventions) duly makes 
those interpretations".  
 
The tools employed in creating the 
fragmentary evidence include the shot, the 
camera view, the information and the 
affective expressivity as well as the 
contextualisation of the shot. These tools are 
brought together in the editing, and the author 
states that the contextual information of a shot 
provides the “psychologically necessary” 
aspect. From here, Davis turns to interactive 
media games and suggests that it may be 
fruitful to evaluate them within the same 
framework: as essentially pictorial. He argues 
that ideally the design should make users 
"believe that they are interactive observers of 
a world". Davis points out that one of the 
problems is the constraint spatiality in 
interactive media and suggests exploring the 
issue by focusing on the “make believe”, 
which can be found in the "spatial maturity" 
in filmmaking. The essence is "psychological 
immersion” where the visual images enhance 
the viewer’s feeling of being psychologically 
immersed.  
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3.1 Fragmentary evidence and the 
interactive observer 
Into the concept of visual communication, 
Davis introduces the role of the tools and 
techniques in the production of living pictures 
and allows us to move beyond the design and 
analysis of the static image into the realm of 
dynamic images. Filmmaking offers us a 
frame for understanding the visual 
communication of graphic interfaces. Davis 
also points to essential dimensions in the 
viewing of the filmmaker’s imagined vision; 
the fragmentary evidence that provides the 
psychologically necessary aspect. In this way, 
Davis establishes a relation between the 
filmmaker and the viewer; an accordance with 
the filmmaker's fragmentary evidences and 
the viewer's assumptions and interpretations 
of these. And here the viewer becomes - in 
Davis’ words - an interactive observer. 
Hence, Davis ascribes an active role to the 
viewer in creating understanding and sense-
making, and he understands the process as 
interpretations made on the basis of shared, 
cultural conventions.  
 
However, we need a way into the analysis of 
visual, dynamic communication, and 
Thorlacius’ theoretical model allows us to 
discuss the designer's intentions and the 
relationship to the viewers/users’ sense 
making. Thorlacius' distinction between the 
expressive and the emotive functions that the 
designer may/may not possess and may 
in/or/unintentionally evoke in the user 
indicate the psychological forces at work. It 
may help us capture the conscious intention 
and the unconscious emotive forces in the 
designer’s mind if the analysis integrates the 
intentional and expressible aspects in the 
aesthetics of the visual dynamic images, 
including the unintentional but expressed 
elements within the fragmentary evidence. 
But Thorlacius' conceptual framework also 
provides us with an approach to the user's 
sense-making, including the elements that are 
unrelated to the designer's intentions. This 
opens a way for an understanding of the user 
as a psychological individual, bringing 
subjective assumptions and interpretations 
into the interaction.  
 
3.2 Immersion in a make-believe world 
Having gained access to is not the same as 
being able to carry out an in depth analysis of 
the psychological processes at work in the 
user. Here, Davis takes us one step further in 
our analysis of the user's experience of the 
design. He points to the importance of the 
psychological immersion - the feeling of 
being in a make-believe world, again giving 
ample room to the film viewers’ 
psychological make up. The author argues 
that the feeling of being psychologically 
immersed is created through the spatial design 
competence of filmmaking and suggests that 
we draw on film when designing for 
immersion in virtual spaces. 
 
The feeling of psychological immersion must 
not be disregarded. In film, as in media 
games, the feeling of being up there on the 
screen moving around with the characters, 
living with them, is essential. However, I will 
argue that in film viewing, the descending 
darkness, the sound that surrounds us, the 
large screen and as a consequence the others, 
the audience who disappears, also play a 
critical role in the immersion.  
 
Drawing on filmmaking poses limitations. 
The audience is regarded as observers, and 
their interaction is limited to making 
assumptions and interpretations according to 
the filmmaker’s intention. They have no 
influence on the unfolding story, they cannot 
change its course, move objects around, 
change the setting, etc. The interaction that 
IT-media systems require is missing. A 
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prerequisite for this interaction is 
interpretations and assumptions, and in this 
respect the mental processes are the same as 
in film viewing. But the interaction also 
requires participation. The user must become 
an interactive participant, bringing her/is 
individual, psychological powers of thought 
to the relation. Hence, interactive design 
makes room for a story to unfold - and it is 
through the individual’s psychological 
powers, decision making and action taking 
that the story is told. I shall return to the issue, 
but first I want to look at spatial design and 
how it may enhance psychological 
immersion. I suggest that we turn to 
architecture – the making of spaces.  
 
4. EMBODIED SPACES 
Andreas Lueschers´ perspective is 
architecture and educational models (design 
representations). He discusses image 
representations (in architecture, theatre, 
paintings, sculptures, etc) of three or more 
dimensions of information on two-
dimensional display surfaces and the 
simulation of a full spatial experience with 
horizontal, vertical and temporal extensions. 
Luescher presents historical evidence of 
visualization techniques where environmental 
representation embeds “sensual engagement, 
material exploration, and a connection with 
the real” (Luescher 2002). Such a 
representation involves a synthesis of touch, 
sound and movement, an experience that 
results in bodily, sensual, emotional and 
intellectual understandings. One such 
representation is the panorama in paintings, 
the experience of which is “qualitatively 
different from looking at a picture isolated 
within a frame. …… The panorama made it 
necessary to move not only one’s eyes and 
head, but also one’s body in order to 
assimilate the vast continuous picture” (ibid). 
The history of visualization also becomes the 
history of immersion in the image and of 
embodied, perceptual experience 
technologies. Luescher points out that the 
same development takes place in architectural 
design courses where experiments with 
representations turn experiences into bodily, 
sensuous, time and spatial constructions. The 
process involves letting students make 
constructions in 1:1 scale in solid materials 
instead of just letting them draw in 1:10 on 2-
d paper.  
 
4.1 The perceptual experience of an actor 
With Luescher, the representations become 
solid and not just visual. The architectural 
concept of visual communication as embodied 
spaces that require immersion takes the visual 
communication out of the spectator or 
observer perspective and moves it into the 
actor’s perspective. When an actor interacts 
with physical material, it may result in bodily, 
sensual, emotional and intellectual 
understandings. Luescher gives us an 
understanding of the essence of physical 
immersion in architectural prototypes – by 
bodily moving into them. But he also gives us 
an understanding of physical immersion in 
panoramic paintings when he speaks of 
immersion in images – by bodily moving 
along the painting. To Luescher, this is 
exactly the limitation of the computer. He 
questions the claimed revolutionary potential 
of the computer in terms of imaging and the 
promise of immersion. He points out that 
computer representations remain screen-
bound, small-scale and impenetrable treating 
constructions as drawings. Hence, a student of 
architecture engaged in a computer based 
design course will never be able to experience 
a bodily, sensuous, emotional and intellectual 
understanding of space.  
 
Clearly, this raises the question of what 
happens when we interact with virtual 
material in virtual spaces. Here, the 
interaction will be mental – interacting with a 
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computer implies moving into spaces that are 
not tangible, spaces that we cannot touch or 
smell. On the contrary, this is a mental 
process involving senses, emotions, body and 
thoughts. How can we understand the 
psychological processes involved in the 
immersion and how can we conceptualise 
embodied experience in the construction of 
visual, spatial representations? Is it possible to 
talk in a meaningful way of the embodied 
immersion in visual, spatial representations – 
embodiment that is mental?  
 
4.2 Psychological immersion in the 
interface  
Luescher questions the immersion when 
images are screen-bound, small and 
impenetrable. However, Davis’ approach to 
filmmaking indicates that psychological 
immersion is not only a question of the size of 
the screen or the body moving along or into 
sensing and feeling, etc. Immersion is also a 
question of the design of the representation – 
the way it is communicated – the extent to 
which the designer succeeds in offering 
fragmentary evidence that allows the user to 
make interpretations and  - and this is 
essential - entices the user to act, to interact 
with the interface. Yet, it cannot be physical 
immersion. It is true that screen bound 
interfaces do not offer physical immersion, 
although the space is visual like in paintings. 
But a screen is not a picture in a frame. The 
picture that we see on the screen is a 
representation of the underlying software 
program and it requires an actor. Besides, the 
computer interface offers something different 
and additional – it offers interaction that may 
open for the mental exploration of 
representations. Just think of interactive 
adventure games. They require participation 
of the user – psychological involvement, and 
they may result in bodily, sensual, emotional 
and intellectual understandings, even an 
experience of bodily and psychological 
immersion.  
 
5. STEPS TO A THEORETICAL FRAME 
FOR INTERFACE DESIGN 
The presentation of all the different 
perspectives contributes to the 
interdisciplinary framework for analysis and 
design of interfaces. Thorlacius takes the 
designer’s perspective and her focus is the 
design, the visual communication. Her 
theoretical frame gives us access to in depth 
analysis of the expressive, emotive and 
aesthetic functions of the visual 
communication. The conceptual model also 
points towards users’ perceptions of 
designers’ intentions – embedded in the 
expressive, emotive and aesthetic functions. 
But within the model, it is not possible to 
capture the individual user and the cognitive 
qualifications that s/he brings into play. As 
the user, interfaces are dynamic, interactive 
and constitutive factors in the interaction, 
which distinguishes media games, database 
interfaces and web sites from traditional 
media. Thorlacius’ conceptual frame clearly 
leaves room for unfolding this aspect. 
However, it has not been the focus of her 
work. 
 
Davis takes us into living pictures and media 
games and reminds us of the tools and 
techniques employed in the design of visual 
communication. His discussion of how the 
designers’ organisation of fragmentary 
evidence affords the assumptions and 
interpretations that the user duly makes (due 
to shared cultural world), including his 
concept of the participant observer, open for 
further analysis of the psychological – or 
mental – process of the user.  
 
Davis suggests that to become a participant 
observer requires psychological immersion in 
the spatial design. With this argument, he 
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points to an essential aspect of visual 
communication in filmmaking. However, in 
the world of games, it is not sufficient to 
observe, participate in sense making and feel 
immersed. The user is required to act, to 
engage in mental visual interactions, and the 
observer becomes an active user and 
contributor to the interaction. As a 
consequence, an understanding of the user as 
actor and as interacting with the dynamic 
interface (which is the representation of the 
program that the user sees) becomes essential 
for the interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework. 
  
Turning to architecture, Luescher offers us the 
actor – and interaction with the material s/he 
is working with. His perspective is the 
creation of spaces and the experience of 
spaces. He understands spaces as embodied 
perceptual experiences where the architectural 
design invites physical immersion in terms of 
body and senses, including emotions and 
intellect. With his discussion of the panoramic 
painting, which requires the eyes to move 
around in the painting and the body to move 
along the painting, he opens for an 
understanding of the mental immersion, the 
mental interaction – in physical spaces.  Yet, 
he maintains that it is primarily physical 
immersion – but how can it be separated from 
the psychological immersion in the image? 
Physical interaction – as the body moves 
alongside a painting or into a man size 
architectural construction - is also a mental 
(psychological) interaction. The construction 
is a simulation, not the real thing, which 
requires the creative powers of the human 
mind; to imagine the experience of moving 
around in an imagined space while moving in 
its simulation. This is one of the incredible 
forces of human life. We are constantly 
engaged in sense-making whether we interact 
with people, watch a movie, surf on the net or 
use an administrative program. It is the 
imaginative powers of the mind that are at 
play here, and although Luescher does not 
focus on and explicitly discuss this issue, his 
understanding of immersion in the image 
opens for an understanding of visual 
interaction. In the following, a psychological 
model of human perception and sense giving 
is introduced in order to contribute to the 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework. 
 
6. THE IMAGINATIVE POWERS OF 
THE MIND 
Michael Polanyi (1968) understands visual 
perception as a way of seeing reality in 
gestalts. He argues that knowledge 
fundamentally rests upon indeterminacy in 
content, the connections we see and the data 
upon which we base our results. He suggests 
that different forms of insight exist and that 
“explanations must be understood as a 
particular form of insight” (Polanyi, 1968, p 
30). This implies that there are other forms of 
insights, and he is especially interested in 
these other forms, the tacit psychological 
forms. He introduces these undefinable 
insights through his concepts of tacit 
inference and tacit knowledge and shows that 
“we know more than we can say” (Polanyi, 
1968, p 30). This is because knowing is based 
on “indefinable powers of thought” (ibid p. 
27).  
 
We may approach these indefinable powers 
by introducing Polanyi’s differentiation 
between focal awareness and subsidiary 
awareness. One can be consciously aware and 
focus on something specific; this is focal 
awareness. At the same time, other factors in 
the borderline of one’s conscious awareness 
are interacting and supporting the focal 
awareness. This is the subsidiary awareness. 
He discusses these concepts by drawing on 
everyday life giving examples on visual 
perception, body perception and perception 
of language.  
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6.1 Perception  
Polanyi understands perception as the essence 
of tacit inference and tacit knowing, and as 
such it is beyond language. He explains it as a 
psychological process that establishes an 
observation of external facts “without formal 
argument and even without explicitly stating 
the results.” (p. 29). The first example is 
language perception, e.g. reading a text. The 
focal awareness in reading a text is not on 
each letter or each word, nor on the sentence. 
They function as subsidiaries for what we are 
focusing on: the meaning that lies outside us. 
The functional aspect of subsidiaries (letters, 
words, sentences, etc.) bears on the focus of 
our attention, and through the act of a person, 
the knower “who integrates one to the other”, 
the subsidiaries become related to a focus. 
This integration is an (unconscious) tacit 
inference where the knower “sees” coherence 
where there is no coherence. It is a tacit act of 
a person and irreversible, as opposed to 
explicit inference (consciously intentional), 
which is reversible. Tacit inference is a 
process of integration – not deduction. 
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To explain the general structure of this 
process, Polanyi introduces: The tacit triad. 
To understand the triad better, let us turn to 
body perception. This will also help us 
understand the phenomenal aspects of from-
to-knowing. Imagine that you are blindfolded 
and have to feel your way in the dark with the 
help of e.g. a stick. Polanyi argues that we do 
not focus on the feeling of the stick in our 
hand, which is subsidiary. Our attention is on 
the far end of the stick. Actually, we feel the 
point of the stick as it touches an obstacle in 
the dark. He calls this the phenomenal aspect 
of from-to knowing. In this case, it is a 
phenomenal transformation – arrived at by 
projecting our senses out into the world.  
 
The third example deals with visual 
perception. Polanyi discusses what we see 
when we look through a stereoscope. You 
may want to try and use you hands as 
binoculars putting one hand before each eye. 
Close one eye and look, and you will see one 
image. In the next step, close the other eye, 
and you will see another image. The third step 
involves looking with both eyes through your 
“binoculars” – and a third image is seen, 
based on the differences between the two 
stereo images.  
subsidiary 
awareness 
The two images function as subsidiaries to 
your view of the joint image, but your focus is 
not on the joint image, it is on the meaning of 
it. He argues that this is a typical structure of 
tacit knowing; a from-to-knowing – from the 
subsidiaries to the focal target, and the focal 
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 description). The 
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can dissolve a triad 
e subsidiaries, e.g. 
e object of focal 
target is the meaning of the subsidiaries. He 
calls it an act of sense giving, which is the 
semantic aspect of from-to-knowing.  
 
Hence, Polyani argues that we should 
acknowledge that: 
• we can “see beyond established facts”.  
8
• we have the “capacity of feeling 
…subtle, virtually invisible, signs of 
reality”.  
• we have the power to ”…know far 
more than we can tell” (p30). 
 
6.2 Indwelling and Sense Giving 
The basis of this process of perception is the 
human ability to extend our senses out into 
the world. The process of projecting ourselves 
out into the world is also described as 
“pouring one’s body into” or interiorising it. 
To make “something function subsidiarily is 
to interiorise it, or else to pour one’s body 
into it”. (p. 33). Polanyi calls the ability to 
inhabit the artefacts around us for 
“indwelling”. He considers this cognitive and 
emotive qualification as essential for the 
construction of knowledge and meaning. It 
should be noticed here that the focal target, 
which forms the meaning of the subsidiaries 
is placed some distance away from us. Our 
senses point into external space just as our 
actions are projected outward. Hence, the 
objects of our conscious attention lie 
predominantly outside us.3 
 
The cognitive processes are tacit inferences, 
and in these inferences we see more than 
there is to see, establish coherence where 
there is no coherence and know more than we 
can tell, because we give sense – construct 
meaningfulness. The reason is that in the act 
of knowing, subsidiaries bear on focal 
awareness towards the focal target, meaning. 
But meaning lies outside us – in the 
integration of the subsidiaries (and remember 
the process is unconscious) into the focal 
target. The integration is tacit and as a 
consequence it cannot be talked about nor 
captured in verbalisations. In Polanyis’ 
discussion, perception becomes a very 
complicated cognitive process and the essence 
is the act of sense-giving. It is the knower – 
the ordinary person – who in the act of giving 
sense comes to understand her/is world. 
Hence, knowing is not the same as 
verbalisation. On the contrary, it is much 
more than what we can verbalise and it is to a 
large extent inexpressible. Although you may 
be the knower who integrates into the act of 
sense giving, you do it on the basis of 
indwelling – this is the essence of knowing. It 
involves the imaginative powers of the mind. 
                                                 
3 Polanyi reflects upon how “our own existence, which we 
experience, and the world that we observe are interwoven 
here. Bodily being, ……( ). ..becomes a being in the world, 
while external observations and projects subsidiarily 
involving one’s own bodily feelings become, up to a point … 
an existential choice”. (pp.33-34). He infers that applied to 
science – “the existential choices involve modifying the 
ground of scientific judgement”. 
 
7. VISUAL INTERACTION – discussion 
and reflections 
In a design process, you move through many 
drafts and prototypes of the interface design. 
During this process, design elements come 
together in incidental and unplanned ways. 
Some of these “coming together” incidents 
may speak so clearly for themselves that the 
designer includes them in the design – 
without realizing that they have “constituted 
themselves”. Hence, the design elements 
themselves may contribute to the 
unintentional, but expressible aspects that 
cannot be classified. However, my interest is 
a psychological frame that may enhance the 
understanding of the user. In this connection, 
the aesthetic function – the inexpressible 
aspect that the user perceives although it 
cannot be explicitly verbalised - becomes 
interesting. This step in the analysis of the 
visual communication takes us close to the 
psychological forces working in the subject. 
However, it stops short of interaction – and it 
is not able to explain the psychological 
subject or what the user brings to the 
understanding of visual communication. 
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Thorlacius is aware that designing digital 
interfaces differs from designing visual 
communication. It also includes designing 
interaction. It is interesting that when the 
author turns to the concept of interaction, she 
defines interaction from the user’s point of 
view, but as physical, not cognitive 
interaction.4 A web site e.g. requires that 
somebody starts interacting with it physically. 
Somebody has to enter the site address and 
somebody has to click on the mouse. 
However, it is a prerequisite that somebody 
interacts psychologically with the site, reads 
the screen, makes sense of the information, 
navigates, etc. Interaction with an interface is 
more mental than physical. It is not sufficient 
for a hand to click on the mouse to make 
communication work. The computer is a 
symbolic processing machine, presenting 
graphics on the screen that meet the eye and 
interact directly with our mind. Visual 
communication cannot be separated from 
mental interaction.  
 
7.1 Fragmentary evidence and sense-
making  
Davis draws on techniques and methods used 
in the creation of the film media, and the 
relation to design of interactive games is 
clear. Here, it is possible to design the 
fragmentary evidence that affords 
assumptions and interpretations. It also seems 
to be a possible scenario for design of e.g. 
databases and graphic dynamic interfaces 
discussed at a general level. However, if the 
discussion focuses on interfaces in websites, 
the relation changes radically. Here, the user 
has to create the story. Each website is a 
world of its own. But, at the same time, a 
website is, in principle, linked to all other 
websites. Even though the designer creates 
fragmentary evidence, it remains largely 
fragmented, because it cannot be organized to 
afford interpretations and assumptions – as 
the designer has no control over the web. It is 
the user who – through the creative powers of 
her/is mind - has to make sense out of the 
fragmented evidence. Following a link to a 
new link and again to another link, etc. – 
takes the user out of the designer’s 
constructed world. It is the user who has to 
engage her/himself, and it is the user’s 
understanding and perception that select and 
connect the fragments. Obviously, certain 
affordances may be designed within the 
contained world of a single web site, but there 
is no guarantee that the user will access the 
site as the designer intended or stay within the 
frame of a given site. Besides, the user’s way 
into the web is in principle endless and 
fundamentally depends upon subjective 
criteria. Although many stories may be 
constructed a priori, no fragmentary evidence 
is guaranteed to afford certain assumptions 
and interpretations. Here, the user draws upon 
subjective knowledge and experiences 
creating an understanding that enables her/im 
to click and go on to a new page. The users 
provide the interpretations and make the 
assumptions – they cannot a priori be 
designed into the web – on the contrary. 
Hence, the user is not a participant observer, 
but an interactive actor and co-producer of 
visual communication and interaction – by 
seeing coherence where there is no coherence 
and by her/his meaning and sense making. 
                                                 
4 Thorlacius’ interest  is the designed interfaces and the 
visually communicating artefacts in the design. Hence, she is 
not concerned with the user perspective nor with  visual 
communication as a mental process of interpretation –from a 
user’s  point of view (and one might say as a mental process 
of expression from a designer’s point of view).  
 
7.2 The psychological subject 
Fragmentary evidence is organised to enhance 
certain assumptions and interpretations, and 
on this basis, we may look at the viewer as 
participating in creating understandings. Here, 
Davis indicates the psychological activity 
required, and as such he makes room for 
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mental processes. But in traditional films, the 
viewer is an observer, because s/he has no 
influence on the story unfolding – the 
filmmaker has designed its course. However, 
it is the assumptions about the human mind 
embedded in Davis´ theory that I find 
interesting. Davis believes that a human being 
is able to make sense out of fragmented 
evidence. It is a general human competence of 
meaning construction (Bruner, Jerome 1990). 
Human beings live a life that is fragmented – 
seen from the outside. Fragmented 
information, fragmented interaction and 
fragmented communication fragment our 
actions, etc. However, seen from the inside of 
an individual human being, his/her life is 
coherent because of his/her ability to make 
sense. We are engaged in a constant process 
of sense making, seeing coherence where 
there is no coherence and constructing life as 
meaningful. Life becomes meaningful 
because we are not observers; we live life and 
understand it from an embodied point of 
view. We are immersed in life, whatever 
actions we engage in – we are not outside it. 
(Winograd Terry and Fernando Flores, 1984).  
 
Fragmentary evidence only appears as 
fragments on the background of nothingness 
and the black holes between the fragments. 
Making sense of fragmentary evidence and 
the background is an active process, in which 
the elements must be constructed into 
coherent stories. Such a process requires 
mental immersion and not just observations. It 
is necessary to project our senses out into 
nothingness, fragments and incoherence. 
Hence, the meaning lies outside us and can 
only come into existence through an act of 
sense giving. Only by dwelling in may 
coherence come into being, and here the 
fragmentary evidence and the black holes 
function in the subsidiary awareness of our 
focus bearing down on our focal awareness. 
In a tacit process of from-to-knowing, the two 
elements are connected to a whole, coherence 
is seen and sense is given. This is a 
psychological process. Just think of the 
process of surfing on the web, trying to find 
information that is not specified clearly – or 
think of reading and writing a paper with 
fragmented sentences, fragmented 
understandings and fragmented knowing, 
which the surfer or writer brings into mental 
interaction.  
 
7.3 Immersion in virtual spaces 
Davis argues that the user’s experience of 
psychological immersion depends upon the 
representation of spatiality, which will induce 
users to believe that they are participant 
observers of the world. As such, make-believe 
offers a possibility for psychological 
immersion. Ideally, I (the film viewer) must 
feel that I am up on the movie screen living 
among the people, I must mentally project my 
senses, indeed myself on to the screen and 
move around in the filmic space. I must forget 
my physical body and project my self onto the 
screen – I must feel psychologically 
immersed and believe that I am a participant 
observer. In this way, we may understand 
how the participant observer engages in a 
mental process where s/he mentally connects 
the fragments into coherence.   
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But in interactive media, visual 
communication must also be understood in 
relation to interaction, the user’s visual 
interaction with the media. Interaction is not 
just based on “make believe” where users 
think they are “interactive observers of the 
world”. To some extent, we might say that 
there is no need for make believe in 
interactive media. The media requires that the 
user acts and interacts with the visual 
elements, changes, reconstructs or 
deconstructs, navigates into, moves on, 
leaves, etc.5 
 
Here, immersion may be understood based on 
our ability to be in the world and to project 
our senses out into the world. Based on 
Polanyi, we may speak of our ability to pour 
our bodies into the visual, dynamic graphics 
unfolding before our very eyes. We are only 
able to make sense of images, interact with 
them and work with them through the 
extension of our senses into the visual 
representation. The process kind of involves 
moving from inside-out and from outside–in, 
through which an internalisation takes place; 
we become one with the sense-giving and 
meaning construction.  
  
This mental process does not differ from 
immersion in spatial images represented in 
solid material. Moving bodies along and into 
– is also an embodied perceptual experience. 
It is a physical immersion that can only be 
experienced by projecting our bodies into 
something, and what we feel is not the man 
size world, but the place where our senses 
encounter the world. In a phenomenal 
transformation, we give sense to our 
perceptions. Luescher questions immersion in 
two-dimensional screen bound interfaces as 
opposed to immersion in panoramic paintings 
where our eyes must move around in and our 
body move alongside the painting. However, 
immersion is not tied to and restricted by 
movement of the body. Besides, physical 
immersion in panoramic paintings cannot be 
separated from psychological immersion. As 
we move along the painting, our senses are 
assaulted by the traces left by the brush on the 
canvas, the colours in fat oily strokes, 
thousands of points, shapes, images, smell, 
etc. 
                                                 
5 Obviously, the user’s control over the information, interface 
and interaction depends upon the specific system. For the 
purpose of a theoretical discussion on visual interaction, I 
work from an ideal model of users’ ownership of information 
and control of the interface.  
 
Design is not just a question of offering 
fragmentary evidence that affords 
interpretations by the user. Interactive 
interfaces offer more than films and paintings. 
The space is visual as in paintings or films. 
But it offers fragmentary evidence that entices 
the user to act – to interact with the interface. 
It offers interaction that may open for 
exploration of representations, psychological 
involvement and result in bodily, sensual, 
emotional and intellectual understandings, 
even the experience of bodily and 
psychological immersion. And the activity 
becomes meaningful because the users are 
engaged in interaction and understand it from 
an embodied point of view.  Users are 
immersed, also when they engage in actions 
such as interacting with an interface.  
 
I will take the liberty to rephrase Lueschers´ 
statement into an entirely different claim: 
Computers offer representations, dynamic 
representations that embed possibilities of 
sensual, emotional and intellectual 
engagement, even possibilities of virtual 
exploration of materials and the electronic 
images and animations of designers’ imagined 
vision. These representations require the 
user’s participation, and the experience may 
enhance intellectual, sensual, emotional and 
even bodily understandings. However, 
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exploration of and experiments with the 
medium is necessary to develop a better 
understanding. The fundamental requirement 
is human participation, and the study of 
interaction with the symbolic representations 
may enhance our understanding of how 
computer-mediated representations in the 
interface interact with intellectual, sensual, 
emotional and bodily cognitive processes in 
virtual spaces. 
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